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Abstract
This paper analyzes the security of a recent cryptosystem based on the ergodicity
property of chaotic maps. It is shown how to obtain the secret key using a chosen-
ciphertext attack. Some other design weaknesses are also shown.
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1 Introduction
Chaotic maps possess an ergodic behavior which makes them suitable for the
design of new cryptosystems. This is the case of the cryptosystem proposed
in [1]. This cryptosystem is based on the tent map and has been cryptanalyzed
in [2] and later improved in [3]. In [4] a new modification on the original scheme
described in [1] was proposed. The authors of this new proposal claim that
this modification overcomes all the security problems that were emphasized
in [2,3]. Nevertheless, in this paper we show that the ciphertext still includes
enough information to enable a chosen-ciphertext attack based on symbolic
dynamics. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First of all, Sec. 2 gives
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a brief introduction to the cryptosystem under study. After that, in Sec. 3 the
symbolic dynamics based chosen-ciphertext attack is explained. Then some
other problems of the cryptosystem under study are discussed in Sec. 4, and
finally the last section gives some final comments and conclusions.
2 Description of the cryptosystem
The cryptosystem described in [4] is based on the transformation of chaotic
orbits into binary sequences. These chaotic orbits are generated using a one-
dimensional chaotic map defined by
xn+1 = f(xn, r), (1)
where f : I → I and 0.5 ∈ I ⊂ R. If Eq. (1) is iterated N times, then a
chaotic orbit will be obtained as
{xn}
N
n=0 = {x0, x1, . . . , xN} . (2)
The authors of [4] do not explicitly indicate if x0 is also included in the chaotic
orbit as the first chaotic state. Without loss of generality, in this paper we will
assume that this was included.
Finally, the binary counterpart (i.e., the symbolic dynamics based representa-
tion) of the original chaotic orbit is given by
gn = gn(x0, r) =


0 , if xn < 0.5,
1 , if xn ≥ 0.5,
(3)
for 0 ≤ n ≤ N . Henceforth, the binary sequence {gn(x0, r)}
N
n=0 is noted as
GN(x0, r) to emphasize its dependency with the initial condition and the con-
trol parameter.
The cryptosystem works as follows.
• Step 1) Initialize i = 0, j = 0.
• Step 2) For the i-th plain block Pi formed by bi = b bits, try to find the first
bi-bit segment of {gn}
Nmax+bi
n=j which is equal to Pi; in case a segment is not
found, let bi = bi − 1 and repeat this step
1 . The parameter Nmax indicates
the maximum number of trials in the searching of Pi through the binary
sequence.
1 Note that in [4], there was a typo about bi = bi − 1, which was published as
“bi = bi + 1”.
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• Step 3) Denoting by ni the number of iterations needed to locate the dis-
tinguished bi-bit segment from gj, output (bi, ni) as the i-th cipher-block.
• Step 4) Set i = i+1 and j = j+ni+ bi
2 , then go to Step 2 until the whole
plaintext is exhausted.
The decryption process is simpler than the encryption one. In this case, the
searching process becomes unnecessary. For the recovery of the i-th plain block,
one simply iterates the chaotic map from the current status for ni + bi times
and record the last bi chaotic states, which are then transformed into the i-th
bi-bit plain block according to Eq. (3).
In [4] it is claimed that the secret key of the cryptosystem is composed of
the initial condition x0 and the control parameter r. For a more detailed
description of the encryption/decryption procedures, the reader is referred
to [4].
3 Chosen-ciphertext attack
In [4] it is mentioned that most chaotic systems can be used to implement the
above described cryptosystem. Moreover, the resistance of the cryptosystem
against the attacks presented in [2] is assumed without any security analysis.
However, this section proves that a wrong selection of the chaotic map allows
an estimation of the secret key through a chosen-ciphertext attack.
Among all the possible options, the logistic map was chosen in [4] as the
chaotic system to prove the reliability of the cryptosystem. The logistic map
is defined as
xn+1 = f(xn, r) = r · xn · (1− xn), (4)
for r ∈ (3.57148, 4) and xn ∈ [0, 1]. The function f(x, r) for the logistic map
is a concave function with only one critical point at 0.5. For this kind of maps
the binary sequence referred in Eq. (3) can be interpreted as a Gray code [5,6].
Moreover, in [7–9] it is shown that the family of Gray codes generated using
Eq. (3) can be assigned an order according to the initial condition and the
control parameter. The existence of this order allows an estimation of the
control parameter r and the initial condition x0 just by analyzing the binary
sequence GN(x0, r) for a sufficiently large number N . Therefore, as long as one
can reconstruct the sequence GN(x0, r), one can estimate the secret key of the
cryptosystem. This is used to build an attack with three different stages:
2 In [4] it is not explicitly mentioned how to update the index j. In this paper, we
assume that it is updated in such a way that no segment of a chaotic orbit will be
reused for encryption of two continuous plain blocks.
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(1) Reconstruction of the Gray code derived from the logistic map.
(2) Estimation of the control parameter from the reconstructed Gray code.
(3) Estimation of the initial condition from the reconstructed Gray code and
the estimated control parameter.
3.1 Reconstruction of the Gray code
If one has access to the decryption machine, then one can perform a chosen-
ciphertext attack [10, p. 25] to reconstruct GN(x0, r), i.e., the Gray code as-
sociated to the values of x0 and r that make up the secret key of the cryp-
tosystem under study. To do so, M ciphertexts are generated as (b, b · i) for
i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,M . As an example, let us assume that x0 = 0.5 and r = 3.78.
In this case, it is satisfied that
GN(0.5, 3.78) = {1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1 . . .} .
As a result, if we ask the decryption machine to decrypt (8, 0), then we obtain
{1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1}. Similarly, the decryption machine will return {1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0}
when the input is (8, 8), and {1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1} when the input is (8, 16). In
other words, the decryption of the first ciphertext returns the first b bits of
GN(x0, r), the decryption of the second ciphertext gives the second set of b
bits of GN (x0, r), and so on.
3.2 Estimation of the control parameter
If the binary sequence (i.e., the Gray code) derived from the iteration of the
logistic map is known, then it is possible to infer the value of r based on the
concept of Gray Ordering Number (GON). The GON was introduced in [5]
as a way to reinterpret the main results of [11] in a more intuitive way. The
calculation of the GON of a binary sequence GN(x0, r) involves two steps:
• The binary sequence is transformed into another binary sequence using the
next equation:
ui(x0, r) =


gi(x0, r), if i = 0,
ui−1(x0, r)⊕ gi(x0, r), if i > 0,
(5)
where i = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N}.
• The GON of the original binary sequence is calculated as:
GON(GN(x0, r)) = 2
−1 · u0 + 2
−2 · u1 + · · ·+ 2
−N−1 · uN . (6)
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According to [8], for any concave unimodal map with critical point equal to
0.5 it is satisfied that
GON(GN(f(x0, r), r)) ≤ GON(G
N(f(0.5, r), r)) (7)
for any value of r in [3, 4] and any value of x0 in [0, 1]. Furthermore, the
function GON(GN(f(0.5, r), r)) is an increasing function with respect to r
(see Fig. 3(a) of [8]). These two facts are used in [8] to estimate the value of the
control parameter r. First of all, the value GON(Gn(f(0.5, r), r)), for n < N ,
is approximated as the maximum value of the GON of M different shift-left
sequences obtained from GN(x0, r). Afterwards, the monotonic relationship
between GON(Gn(f(0.5, r), r)) and r is used to obtain an estimation of r
through a binary search procedure.
In order to test this algorithm, some simulations have been carried out. The
parameter estimation errors for r = 3.9197398122739102 are shown in Fig. 1.
Different values of x0 and N were considered, for a fixed length of the subse-
quences of n = 100. Since this method is based on the approximation of the
maximum of GON(Gn(f(0.5, r), r)) through M different values, it is expected
that the exact value of r cannot be obtained unless the value 0.5 is part of
the chaotic orbit from which the binary sequence was calculated. Moreover,
the characteristic dependency of chaotic maps on the initial condition makes
the parameter estimation error depend on the value of x0, as shows in Fig. 1.
Nevertheless, the proposed method allows to obtain an estimation of r which
implies a considerable narrowing of the key space and which can be further
improved through a trial and error strategy, i.e., a brute force attack on the
value of the control parameter in a dramatically reduced key-space.
3.3 Estimation of the initial condition
In this subsection we will assume that we have obtained the exact value of r by
using the algorithm discussed in the last subsection. Indeed, when considering
the security of a cryptosystem, a partial knowledge of the key must not lead
to the determination of the rest of the key [12, Rule 7]. Therefore, even if we
were not able to estimate the value of r and obtain the exact value through
a brute-force attack, the recovery of x0 based on the knowledge of the other
subkey r would represent a very important flaw of the cryptosystem under
study.
As pointed out in [8], the GON of GN(x0, r) is a monotonic increasing function
with respect to x0 (see Fig. 1 of [8]). This means that one can obtain the
value of x0 through an iterative algorithm similar to that described in the
last subsection. This algorithm was used to estimate the value of the initial
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Fig. 1. Parameter estimation errors for r = 3.9197398122739102, different values of
x0 and N .
condition from which GN(x0, r) was generated. Different values of r, x0 and N
were considered. The results are shown in Fig. 2. For all analyzed situations, a
number of bits greater than 80 implies an estimation error below 10−15. Since
all the simulations were performed using double precision, this means that the
exact recovery of the initial condition is possible.
4 Other weaknesses
In this section some other problems of the cryptosystem under study are em-
phasized.
4.1 Considerations about the chaotic system employed
In [4] it is pointed out that most chaotic systems can be used to implement
the proposed cryptosystem. However, there is no indication of the require-
ments that a chaotic system must fulfill to determine a secure cryptosystem
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Fig. 2. Initial condition estimation errors for different values of r, x0 and N .
according to the proposed encryption/decryption structure. Moreover, in the
previous section we proved that at least a family of chaotic maps, i.e., the
unimodal chaotic maps with fixed critical point equal to 0.5 cannot be used
as long as a high level of security against chosen-ciphertext attack is needed.
Furthermore, a different way should be used to generate the binary sequence
for the encryption procedure. In the original design, this binary sequence is
obtained by comparing each chaotic state included in a chaotic orbit with the
fixed threshold value 0.5. Nevertheless, to ensure good statistical characteris-
tics of the binary sequence, the threshold value should be selected according
to the dynamics of the underlying chaotic system.
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4.2 Considerations about the chaotic orbit generation
The characteristics of a cryptosystem should be precisely defined in order to
facilitate its implementation [12, Rule 1]. During the encryption step of the
cryptosystem under consideration, the plaintext is divided into a set of binary
sequences Pi which are successively located in the binary sequence G
N (x0, r).
It is possible that Pi is not included in G
N(x0, r). In this case, the length of
Pi is progressively decreased until it is found in G
N(x0, r). Nevertheless, there
is no information about the length of GN(x0, r), i.e., about the maximum
number of iterations Nmax needed to conclude whether the length of Pi must
be decreased. Furthermore, not only the length of GN (x0, r) is not explicitly
established, but also some interpretation problems concerning the precise way
of generating GN(x0, r) can be found. Fist of all, in [4] it is not mentioned
whether the first bit of GN(x0, r) corresponds to x0 or to x1. On the other
hand, once the plain block Pi has been encrypted, it is not clear whether
the next binary sequence starts from GN(xni , r), G
N(xni+1, r) or G
N (xni+b, r).
Note that we fixed these problems in our description of the cryptosystem given
in Sec. 2.
4.3 Considerations about the key space
The inadequacy of the logistic map for the implementation of this cryptosys-
tem has been proved by means of a ciphertext attack. However, the selection
of this map entails another important problem that suggests not to choose
the logistic map as a base of any cryptosytem [13]. This problem concerns the
definition of the key space. In [4] it is claimed that the value of the control
parameter r should be selected within the interval (3.57148...., 4) to exhibit
a chaotic behavior. However, the existence of periodic windows in this region
is well known (see Fig. 3) and so the selection of r should be performed in a
more precise manner in order to avoid these [12, Rule 5].
5 Conclusions
Some weaknesses of the chaotic cryptosystem described in [4] have been dis-
cussed in this paper. A chosen-ciphertext attack has been described, which
can recover the secret key of the cryptosystem by exploiting the theory of
symbolic dynamics. Some other problems related to the design of the cryp-
tosystem have also been pointed out. As a result, we recommend not to use
this algorithm for secure applications.
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Fig. 3. Bifurcation diagram of the logistic map showing the existence of periodic
windows.
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